Philosophy David Malet Armstrong

1 philosophy

1.1 metaphysics

1.1.1 universals
1.1.2 states of affairs
1.1.3 laws of nature
1.1.4 dispositions
1.1.5 truth , truthmakers
1.1.6 mind


1.2 epistemology

1.2.1 belief

philosophy

armstrong s philosophy broadly naturalistic. in sketch systematic metaphysics, armstrong states philosophical system rests upon assumption exists space time world, physical world . justifies saying physical world seems exist while other things seem more hypothetical . fundamental assumption flows rejection of abstract objects including platonic forms.

armstrong s development philosopher influenced heavily john anderson, david lewis, , j. j. c. smart, ullin place, herbert feigl, gilbert ryle , g. e. moore. armstrong collaborated c. b. martin on collection of critical essays on john locke , george berkeley.

armstrong s philosophy, while systematic, not spend time on social or ethical matters, , not attempt build philosophy of language. once described slogan put semantics last and, in universals & scientific realism, rebuts arguments in favour of plato s theory of forms rely on semantics describing long but, think, on whole discreditable tradition tries settle ontological questions on basis of semantic considerations .

metaphysics
universals

in metaphysics, armstrong defends view universals exist (although platonic uninstantiated universals not exist). universals match fundamental particles science tells about. armstrong describes philosophy form of scientific realism.

armstrong s universals sparse : not every predicate have accompanying property, deemed basic scientific investigation. ultimate ontology of universals realised completion of physical science. mass universal (subject mass not being discarded future physicists). armstrong realises need refer , use properties not considered universals in sparse ontology—for instance, being able refer being game (to use example wittgenstein s philosophical investigations). armstrong suggests supervenience relation exists between these second order properties , ontologically authentic universals given physics.

armstrong s theory of universals treats relations having no particular ontological difficulty, can treated in same way non-relational properties are. how armstrong s theory of universals deals relations varying adicities has been raised issue fraser macbride. macbride argues there can relations number of terms in relation varies across instances. armstrong s response affirm theory describes principle of instantial invariance, wherein adicity of properties essential , invariant. according armstrong, complex relations seem challenge principle not ontologically real second-order properties can reduced more basic properties subscribe principle of instantial invariance.

armstrong rejects nominalist accounts of properties attempt align properties classes. coextension problem face: if properties classes, in world blue things wet, class nominalists unable draw distinction between property of being blue , being wet. provides analogy argument in euthyphro: electrons electrons because part of class of electrons puts cart before horse. part of class of electrons because electrons.

in armstrong s view, nominalisms can criticised producing blob theory of reality. objects have structure: have parts, parts made of molecules, in turn made of atoms standing in relation 1 another, in turn made of subatomic particles , on. blobbiness threatens platonic universals: particular instantiating universal in world of platonic universals becomes matter of blob-particular having relation universal elsewhere (in platonic heaven, say), rather having internal relation in way chemical element constituent atom.

armstrong further rejects nominalisms deny properties , relations exist in reality because suggests these sorts of nominalisms, referring calls class nominalism, , resemblance nominalism, postulate primitives of either class membership or resemblance. primitive results in vicious regress both kinds of nominalisms, armstrong suggests, motivating states-of-affairs based system unites properties postulating primitive tie of instantiation based on fact-ontology, called states of affairs.

in terms of origin of armstrong s view of universals, armstrong says view of universals relatively unexplored territory points hilary putnam s 1970 paper on properties possible forerunner. says plato in later works, aristotle , scholastic realists ahead of contemporary philosophy in matter, although handicapped relative backwardness of science , scientific methodology of day .

states of affairs

central armstrong s philosophy idea of states of affairs ( facts in russell s terminology): in sketch systematic metaphysics, armstrong claims states of affairs fundamental structures in reality . state of affairs put instantiation of particular , universal: state of affairs might particular atom exists, instantiating universal (say, of particular element, if chemical elements accepted part of armstrong s universals). particulars in armstrong s ontology must have @ least 1 universal—just rejects uninstantiated universals, rejects unpropertied particulars .

armstrong argues states of affairs distinct things in ontology because more sum of parts. if particular has non-symmetric relation r particular b, r (a, b) differs r (b, a). may case r (a, b) obtains in world r (b, a) not. without states of affairs instantiating particulars , universals (including relations), cannot account truth of 1 case , falsity of other.

laws of nature

armstrong s theory of universals gives him basis understanding of laws of nature being relations between universals, non-humean account of laws of nature proposed independently armstrong, michael tooley, , fred dretske. account posits relations between universals truthmakers statements physical laws, , realist accepts laws of nature feature of world rather way talk world. armstrong identifies laws holding between universals rather particulars account of laws involving particulars rather universals not adequately explain how laws of nature operate in case of counterfactuals.

to illustrate theory, stephen mumford gives example of ravens black. under theory of armstrong, tooley , dretske, there relation of necessity between universals ravenhood , blackness, rather there being relationship every single raven. allows explanation of laws of nature have not been instantiated. mumford cites frequently-used example of moa bird: supposed every bird of now-extinct species died @ young age, though not because of in genetic makeup. rather, died because of virus happened sweep through population. 1 bird have escaped virus eaten predator on day before fiftieth birthday. under theory of armstrong, tooley , dretske, such coincidence not law of nature.

dispositions

armstrong rejects dispositionalism, idea dispositional properties (or powers referred to) ontologically significant , have important role in explaining laws of nature. armstrong believes challenge dispositionalism presents account of laws of nature not in case of manifested dispositions (say, glass dropping on ground , breaking) unmanifested dispositions (the fact counter factually if 1 drop glass on ground, break). armstrong states disposition in nature of instantiated properties of thing supposed have disposition.

truth , truthmakers

regarding truth, armstrong holds describes maximalist version of truthmaker theory: believes every truth has truthmaker, although there doesn t exist one-to-one mapping between truth , truthmaker. possibility of 1 many relations between truths , truthmakers feature armstrong believes allows truthmaker theory answer of criticisms levelled @ older correspondence theories of truth (of believes truthmaker theory improved version). negative truths have truthmakers in armstrong s account: gives example of wall painted green. wall being painted green truth proposition not painted white , proposition not painted red , on.

the difficulty in providing adequate account of truthmakers events in past 1 reason armstrong gives rejecting presentism—the view present exists (another reason being incompatibility of such view special relativity). presentists, armstrong argues, must either deny truthmakers needed statements past, or account them postulating rather strange truthmakers .

mind

armstrong holds physicalist, functionalist theory of mind. attracted gilbert ryle s concept of mind , rejection of cartesian dualism. armstrong did not accept behaviourism , instead defended theory referred central-state theory identifies mental states state of central nervous system. in materialist theory of mind, accepted mental states such consciousness exist, stated can explained physical phenomena. armstrong attributes adoption of central-state theory work of j. j. c. smart—specifically paper sensations , brain processes —and traces lineage there ullin place s 1956 paper consciousness brain process?

stephen mumford said armstrong s materialist theory of mind represents authoritative statement of australian materialism , was, , still is, seminal piece of philosophy .

epistemology

armstrong s view of knowledge conditions of knowledge satisfied when have justified true belief arrived @ through reliable process: is, belief caused factor in external world (hence label of externalism). armstrong uses analogy of thermometer: thermometer changes reflect temperature of environment in, must 1 s beliefs if reliably formed. connection between knowledge , external world, armstrong, nomological relationship (that is, law of nature relationship). here, armstrong s view broadly similar of alvin goldman , robert nozick. intuitions lead kind of externalism led alvin plantinga towards account of knowledge added requirement properly-functioning cognitive systems operating according design plan.

belief

on question of relationship between beliefs , knowledge, armstrong defends weak acceptance of belief condition, namely if person can said know thing p, or believes p. in paper aristotelian society, armstrong rejects series of linguistic arguments rejection of belief condition argue 1 can have knowledge without having belief because common usage of word belief imply lack of knowledge—armstrong gives example of if asked man on railway station whether train has left , said believe has , take not know has.

armstrong argues contradictory beliefs show there connection between beliefs , knowledge. gives example of woman has learned husband dead cannot bring herself believe husband dead. both believes , disbelieves husband dead: happens 1 of 2 beliefs justified, true , satisfies knowledge conditions.

armstrong presents response colin radford s modified version of unconfident examinee example. student asked when queen elizabeth died, , hesitatingly answers 1603 , exhibits no confidence in answer. has forgotten @ point previously, studied english history. radford presents example of knowledge without belief. armstrong differs on this: unconfident examinee has belief queen elizabeth died in 1603, knows died in 1603, not know knows. armstrong rejects kk principle—that know thing p, 1 must know 1 knows p. armstrong s rejection of kk principle consistent wider externalist project.