The intelligence Survey Ralph McGehee

royal police of thailand

mcgehee met colonel chat chai, head of police intelligence. personnel knew little communist organization , had no intelligence training. overcoming colonel s initial suspicion, toured police hq in bangkok , later provinces. since 1963 budding insurgency in thailand had received local support , had mounted assassinations , ambushes. although little understood, cia thought several thousand communists in guerrilla bands hid out in highlands, chiefly in thai northeast, , raided lowland villages rice, money , recruits .

from literature on intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency situations, mcgehee adopted mail box technique. functioned suggestion box in civilian life. literate villager provide information anonymously, local insurgent activities, , identities , whereabouts of communist jungle soldiers , supporters... yet remain safe reprisals. government agents, however, not confirm data sourced, nor ask follow-up questions. germ of idea later develop full-scale, effective intelligence-counterinsurgency operation, wrote mcgehee. eventually, in-person interviews of local villager , farmer (called taking census ) appraised provide better information , results. joining team lieutenant somboon, university graduate remarkable intitive feel esoteric art of intelligence gathering. serving local deputy nai amphur (sheriff).

mcgehee proposed develop pilot project , first concentrate on 1 district. thorough survey of views of rural villagers , farmers made. province governor helped recruit select group of twenty-five agents start. beside police, included military officers, several administrators, , high-ranking educator. part of team 4 translators , pat armed force protection against communist guerrillas. questionnaires developed , survey s interrogators trained in use out of hearing range of other[s] . started village networks community support , ongoing intelligence sources. coordinate result, villagers confessed being duped communists, named other members, quit movement , joined government side.

lt. somboon gave motivating speech @ meeting of villagers called headman, countered communist propaganda. , others, however, used aggressive techniques involving simulated threats of death , other cruel ruses obtain information suspected guerrillas, or sow dissension in enemy ranks. such methods raised human rights issues mcgehee. counterinsurgency, if not careful, descend barbarous business. yet persuaded efficient intelligence process, if flawed, threw light on murky shadows guerrillas hid, save lives in long run of counterinsurgency war. in fact, survey , police presence resulted in many villagers abandoning armed communist insurgency.

survey information, collected translated, carded categories, , collated, , digested, written up. bits , pieces of vague, partial, shifting, incomplete, fragmentary intelligence , provided hitherto unknown total picture. revealed, among other things, communist insurgency in northeast thailand considerably stronger supposed. struck blow. survey distributed nationwide government , police officials, praised cia case officer responsible. cos rod johnson called him cia in bangkok work celebrated; promoted 2-year command in thailand. ralph mcgehee felt had hit stride, , reaching new levels of professional skill , acumen.