CIA assignments Ralph McGehee

1 cia assignments

1.1 japan, philippines, 1953-1956
1.2 cia hq, washington, 1956-1959
1.3 taiwan, 1959-1961
1.4 cia hq, langley, 1961-1962
1.5 thailand (1), 1962-1964
1.6 cia hq, langley, 1964-1965
1.7 thailand (2), 1965-1967

1.7.1 intelligence survey
1.7.2 colby visits, ends survey


1.8 cia hq, langley, 1967-1968
1.9 vietnam, 1968-1970
1.10 cia hq, langley, 1970
1.11 thailand (3), 1970-1972
1.12 cia hq, langley, 1972-1977

cia assignments
japan, philippines, 1953-1956

mount fuji, woodblock print.

mcgehee sent japan, went work china operations group.the group s task was, in conjunction allied governments, gather intelligence on prc. group in tokyo area supervised , supported 4 other offices or bases in east asia (seoul, taiwan, hong kong, okinawa). job unfortunately file checker. yet appreciated being involved in immense , noble effort save world international communist conspiracy .

he lived wife , daughters in beautiful home in hayama. had maid , gardener, , view of mt. fuji. husband , wife became intoxicated romance of being overseas. there close knit community of agency families . son born them. yet wife repeat complaints cia rules prohibited talk of company business, within families; insisted marital bonds , trust should stronger.

after 2 , half years, china operations group moved subic bay in philippines. desmond fitzgerald, cia s chief of station (cos) there, become 1 of agency s top leaders. long-time friend of william colby (the cia director in 1970s). yet because of cia secrecy, , need know policy, mcgehee knew comparatively little operations worldwide. cia s china operations @ subic bay terminated, , mcgehees returned home.

cia hq, washington, 1956-1959

at cia headquarters near washington monument, mcgehee became chief of records counterintelligence @ china activities, supervising work had been doing in japan. office had staff of 15 women; admitted better job him. 2 requests routinely came in: file trace (a search records person, e.g., candidate doing business agency); , clearance (a more thorough check, potential cia employees). yet in general cia records in deplorable condition. huge piles of backorders common. expert proposed working criteria selecting files destroy, e.g., duplicates, nonsense, useless. other problems addressed. in mcgehee s unit, chinese characters (often ambiguous non-chinese) variously transliterated different roman letters, making file repetition , confusion. instead, each character reduced 4-digit number.

from saigon former chinese politician claimed contacts in china had excellent intelligence, sent him short-wave radio. politician sought financial support in return current political information. reports appeared valuable. allied intelligence agency told cia newspaper clipping service in saigon probable source. when cia tried listen in transmissions, there silence. instead, intelligence being fabricated bits , pieces of local chinese press coverage, rewritten make incidents more significant cia. yet germ of truth in each gave verisimilitude. later, cia discovered operation run taiwan intelligence agency. rewrites told story mainland china taiwan wanted spread.

after many applications change in status, mcgehee promoted. following 3-months training course, d cia case officer.

taiwan, 1959-1961

chiang ching-kuo & chiang kai-shek.

as case officer work involved liaison chinese counterparts in various nationalist intelligence services. common purpose collecting information on prc. cia worked taiwan train , drop teams of chinese on mainland develop resistance movements , gather intelligence. when mainland fishermen detained on chinmen island [aka quemoy], mcgehee go out debriefing. prc shelled island on hours every other day, hitting barren spots according gentleman s agreement . 1958 quemoy-matsu crisis still fresh.

the cia had great difficulty recruiting agents espionage activity on mainland. hence intelligence on called red china patchy. apparently cia missed great extend of famine in china caused great leap forward.

taiwan offered share 1 of best agents. american officers taught him cia system on many espionage subjects, marveling best agent had ever trained. stay in radio contact daily while on mainland. after 4 months away, returned. yet when away seldom make radio contact. excuses didn t add up. mcgehee not sure if duplicitous nationalist, playing games , or working communists.

ray cline, become major figure in american intelligence, cos in taiwan. friend of cos, chiang ching-kuo, son of generalisimo, visit cia club. upcoming cia hail , farewell gathering, particularly lavish costume party planned, indian tribe theme. cos , mcgehee s clique of 8 couples attended. during late night drive home, mcgehee saw hovels of taiwanese people dressed in rags, in struggle stay alive .

cia hq, langley, 1961-1962

largely because of bay of pigs disaster, cia headquarters rife despair , upheaval . based on news reports, mcgehee thought agency had relied on anticipated uprising cuban people. cia s move new 7-story headquarters building in langley, virginia, began in late 1961. located 9 miles washington on 219 acres , resembled college campus . excitement curtailed cut in personnel, 1 in 5 fired. survivors celebrated. new offices china activities on third floor. after 9 months, offered overseas position in thailand.

thailand (1), 1962-1964

thailand: majority thai speakers dark blue, minority speakers light blue.

by northeast border thailand hill country. mcgehee had set home/office there. worked on thai. on wall placed poster featuring evil-looking mao , ho. contributing cold war tension fear of bloodbath in event of takeover. cia liaison work dealt local thai border patrol police (bpp).

his interpreter, captain song (as mcgehee calls him), headed thai counterinsurgency operations. song had rapport locals , hill tribes, took immediate dislike direct authority on him. there many minority ethnic groups in rugged terrain, several plotting political independence neighboring burma. remote hill tribes practiced slash-and-burn agriculture, necessitating frequent relocations; major cash crop opium poppy. @ moment border quiescent. china apparently failed notice when cia s airplane accidentally crossed border.

perhaps unintentionally, political infighting developed among americans. yet cia station chief naturally gregarious, avoiding conflict. d nurtured close relationship prime minister sarit thanarat. american ambassador, however, did not along sarit. @ well-attended state ceremony, sarit avoided ambassador in favor of chief of station (cos). exacerbated ill-feelings @ top. mcgehee called cos rod johnson .

meanwhile, deputy cos of cia in bangkok had called on mcgehee (now in north) report station. given fictitious name, deputy had acquired bad reputation (bullying, manipulation, grudge holding). cos , deputy made cop, bad cop pair. mcgehee listened in deputy s office, came point where, mcgehee writes, tearing down superiors in presence , asking me spy on them him! consequently, mcgehee s ethics disappointed ambitious deputy. mcgehee figured became latest addition deputy s enemy list; thought people deputy cos, put career above mission, aberrations among otherwise dedicated cia agents. rather mcgehee continued idealize cia activities somewhere between peace corps , missionary work .

on 3-week hike visit remote villages in northeast highlands, mcgehee lost 20 pounds. delivery of medical goods , agricultural implements tribes furthered civil development side of counterinsurgency work. further both objectives, small mountain airstrips facilitate transport more isolated areas. first yao village had 2 dozen bamboo houses roofs of thatch spread out on hillside. gentle, intelligent village headman agreed, @ evening meal, build airstrips. morning cia plane had dropped supplies parachute, scattering them on mountain forest. location airstrip found, , young men selected trained. other airstrips arranged @ other villages. yet few years later, because of communist influence on lao border villages bombed , napalmed thai warplanes. bitter end hill tribes.

cia hq, langley, 1964-1965

at thai desk in langley, mcgehee s job keep track of continuations of work d done in thailand. called paper pushing. general advise not harsh, seemed encourage platitudes. many of reports bangkok station concerned communist party of thailand. once week william colby, far east division chief (and later dci), review reports (with langley comments) , pass on rating sheets d been written up. these sent reporting stations around world, d read gravitas view headquarters.

a subcommittee of congress in session.

it announced colby brief congressional committee secret war in laos. wanted approval new plans of cia. @ first mcgehee pleased part of team doing preparation work. colby stressed importance of using right word. in finding best name hmong tribal groups fought against communists guerillas, middle path between hunter-killer teams , home defense units agreed mobile strike forces . facts seemed open tweaked might make better argument. ineffective present situation become might . mcgehee considered duping congress . colby obtained approval.

president johnson began escalate war in vietnam. in thailand china-based group announced start of revolution. mcgehee asked desk chief him arrange return thailand.

thailand (2), 1965-1967

back in thailand mcgehee s first assignment ssisting in liaison work small thai counterinsurgency force cia had created. these thai agents gathered information on communist activities; acted secret police. mcgehee doubted quality of information gathered untrained interrogators poorly vetted sources, yet @ first wrote cia reports. co-wrote review of large accumulation of counterinsurgency data. concluded without detailed processing, e.g., carding information geographic , subject files , inchoate mess remained . thus, here in thailand or @ cia hq in washington, analyst collating make of wanted .

mcgehee came across ambitious cia case officer guarded field data in locked file room. claimed running, paid cia spy, important leader of communist splinter group. after case officer left thailand, discovered paid spy phony, fabricator of useless, so-called intelligence. unmasked, spy wrote book attacking cia.

the intelligence survey

following departure of disagreeable deputy chief of station (cos), cia station offered mcgehee job of establishing intelligence-collection program 50,000-man national police . after questioning criteria , support available (especially status per american aid program), mcgehee welcomed difficult , challenging task. characterized mission impossible: convert bunch of unschooled patrolmen sophisticated intelligence gatherers , without money , authority comes it. subsequent work here develop intelligence survey program define second tour in thailand.

royal police of thailand

mcgehee met colonel chat chai, head of police intelligence. personnel knew little communist organization , had no intelligence training. overcoming colonel s initial suspicion, toured police hq in bangkok , later provinces. since 1963 budding insurgency in thailand had received local support , had mounted assassinations , ambushes. although little understood, cia thought several thousand communists in guerrilla bands hid out in highlands, chiefly in thai northeast, , raided lowland villages rice, money , recruits .

from literature on intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency situations, mcgehee adopted mail box technique. functioned suggestion box in civilian life. literate villager provide information anonymously, local insurgent activities, , identities , whereabouts of communist jungle soldiers , supporters... yet remain safe reprisals. government agents, however, not confirm data sourced, nor ask follow-up questions. germ of idea later develop full-scale, effective intelligence-counterinsurgency operation, wrote mcgehee. eventually, in-person interviews of local villager , farmer (called taking census ) appraised provide better information , results. joining team lieutenant somboon, university graduate remarkable intitive feel esoteric art of intelligence gathering. serving local deputy nai amphur (sheriff).

mcgehee proposed develop pilot project , first concentrate on 1 district. thorough survey of views of rural villagers , farmers made. province governor helped recruit select group of twenty-five agents start. beside police, included military officers, several administrators, , high-ranking educator. part of team 4 translators , pat armed force protection against communist guerrillas. questionnaires developed , survey s interrogators trained in use out of hearing range of other[s] . started village networks community support , ongoing intelligence sources. coordinate result, villagers confessed being duped communists, named other members, quit movement , joined government side.

lt. somboon gave motivating speech @ meeting of villagers called headman, countered communist propaganda. , others, however, used aggressive techniques involving simulated threats of death , other cruel ruses obtain information suspected guerrillas, or sow dissension in enemy ranks. such methods raised human rights issues mcgehee. counterinsurgency, if not careful, descend barbarous business. yet persuaded efficient intelligence process, if flawed, threw light on murky shadows guerrillas hid, save lives in long run of counterinsurgency war. in fact, survey , police presence resulted in many villagers abandoning armed communist insurgency.

survey information, collected translated, carded categories, , collated, , digested, written up. bits , pieces of vague, partial, shifting, incomplete, fragmentary intelligence , provided hitherto unknown total picture. revealed, among other things, communist insurgency in northeast thailand considerably stronger supposed. struck blow. survey distributed nationwide government , police officials, praised cia case officer responsible. cos rod johnson called him cia in bangkok work celebrated; promoted 2-year command in thailand. ralph mcgehee felt had hit stride, , reaching new levels of professional skill , acumen.

colby visits, ends survey

william colby, chief of cia s far east division, came province in 1967. mcgehee proudly told him of teams work on district survey , findings, showing him file cabinets carded , collated intelligence information. communists in thailand, explained, far more numerous assumed. enjoyed substantial support among rural people. communists agents concentrated on winning cooperation of peasants, citing example of specific village. yet survey had, throwing light on insurgent violence, caused villagers re-think issues , many desert communist cause. mcgehee naturally expected appreciation colby , interest in furthering survey work. colby kept silence.

william colby, cia.

mcgehee described enemy s farmers liberation association (fla). recruited rural villagers, secretly indoctrinated communist plans widespread armed struggle in thailand. local guerrilla cadres launching minor terrorist assaults. in retaliation thai government ordered unfocused, brutal attacks fell on innocent farmers, creating atmosphere of hate communists eager exploit politically. contrary, mcgehee s survey teams had used our intelligence penetrate communists crucial shield of secrecy , accordingly had broken grip on villagers. farmers had confessed, given information, , quit fla. here, mcgehee felt presenting colby counterinsurgency program worked. otherwise, communists insurgents multiply in thailand, had happened in vietnam.

in response, colby appeared puzzled. non-committal, evasive, saying only, seem losing. later mcgehee realized colby weighing broader ramifications. colby , entourage left airport in jeeps , land rovers. 2 months later cos offered mcgehee plum cia job in taiwan on career channel ensuring rapid promotions. mcgehee wanted continue work in thailand. au contraire cos told him. had leave thailand in 3 weeks, , survey project terminated. despite local protests involved thai officials , american consul, happened way.

cia hq, langley, 1967-1968

mcgehee arrived @ headquarters still mystified surprising , unexplained decision, must have been made colby, terminate survey program. had achieved significant results, , received high praise. during last months in thailand mcgehee had labored on intense dedication. unexpectedly cos ordered him out of thailand. plum job in taiwan, had been dangled before him, proved ruse him out of way; upon arrival @ langley, cancelled. mcgehee writes having difficult time justifying idealistic view of agency.

a chinese stamp depicting mao , stalin shaking hands following sino-soviet treaty of friendship in 1950

the head of china activities offered him desk job. judging past results, repetitive failure seemed story job s major task: recruiting chinese official our spy. track record showed repeating cycle of fruitless attempts: new idea, enthusiasm, field action, failure; new idea, enthusiasm... . e.g., after war became known cia estimates of chinese military in vietnam egregiously low.

despite sino-soviet split, mcgehee thought, in china desk seemed have vested interest in keeping china major enemy. cia had obtained recent, 40-page china document detailed prc s long-range foreign policy , short-range moves. nonetheless, china desk decided not circulate it, mcgehee reasoned, because prc s plans reasonable, not belligerent.

he wrote memorandum put thailand survey program in play. first sent colby s new replacement @ far east division (without success), suggestion committee. chief @ china desk told him d ruffled far east division, , jeopardizing own career. mcgehee wrote later awakening see cia in new, cynical way. vietnam in situation similar thailand. volunteered serve cia in vietnam, nobody eye on career doing in 1968. then, out of blue, cia s office of training told him how thailand survey program looked. teaching mcgehee method major part of counterinsurgency training @ cia farm in virginia. yet far east division remained uninterested.

vietnam, 1968-1970
cia hq, langley, 1970

mcgehee set return tour of duty in thailand. @ headquarters attended several briefings, yet growing increasingly dissatisfied cia institution. while in washington, looked job; yet lack of work history (due inability list cia employment) sank efforts. in addition, transforming state of mind made difficult him communicate, anyone. not talk children changing attitudes toward cia , cold war. on campus @ georgetown noticed young dissenters. wanted war stop, too, felt paralyzed internal conflicts.

thailand (3), 1970-1972

the thailand station large installation. mcgehee performed deputy chief of anti-communist party operations branch . supervised many case officers working in liaison. yet realized cia nothing had changed—except own views. u.s policy goals determined intelligence collected. in support of military dictatorship cia never reported derogatory information . american intelligence came thai leaders or liaison counterparts. agency case officers forbidden maintain direct contact general population . 80% of thais farmers, issues seldom addressed. case officer information working classes, risked getting labeled gone native followed ticket home. mcgehee mentions secret war in laos, did not directly participate. although remaining committed stop spread of communist party of thailand opposed considered cia s false testimony , counterproductive operations.

in udorn, north thailand, mcgehee met police colonel, chat chai, d worked on survey program. mcgehee noticed d changed, hard working, no non-sense leader, more relaxed cynic. spoke hours @ hotel s roof-top restaurant. mcgehee found survey deputy nai amphur, lieutenant somboon, in bangkok. stationed in south thailand, faced insurgency, , spoke how survey project went. confused why d been dropped, mcgehee replied d been overruled higher-ups. latter in coffee shop mcgehee spotted classmate, jimmy moe, cia paramilitary course @ farm in virginia 20 years ago. d fought in secret war in laos, cia had led hmong tribe defeat. contemplated each other, , thousand thoughts passed unspoken between us. .

failing promised promotion mcgehee wrote long, bitter memorandum routed cos. mcgehee claimed current, unnamed cos let secretary run station . touring cia inspector general had put mcgehee on special probation . yet mcgehee required surgery. flown georgetown hospital in washington.

cia hq, langley, 1972-1977