Thailand .282.29.2C 1965-1967 Ralph McGehee

royal police of thailand

mcgehee met colonel chat chai, head of police intelligence. personnel knew little communist organization , had no intelligence training. overcoming colonel s initial suspicion, toured police hq in bangkok , later provinces. since 1963 budding insurgency in thailand had received local support , had mounted assassinations , ambushes. although little understood, cia thought several thousand communists in guerrilla bands hid out in highlands, chiefly in thai northeast, , raided lowland villages rice, money , recruits .

from literature on intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency situations, mcgehee adopted mail box technique. functioned suggestion box in civilian life. literate villager provide information anonymously, local insurgent activities, , identities , whereabouts of communist jungle soldiers , supporters... yet remain safe reprisals. government agents, however, not confirm data sourced, nor ask follow-up questions. germ of idea later develop full-scale, effective intelligence-counterinsurgency operation, wrote mcgehee. eventually, in-person interviews of local villager , farmer (called taking census ) appraised provide better information , results. joining team lieutenant somboon, university graduate remarkable intitive feel esoteric art of intelligence gathering. serving local deputy nai amphur (sheriff).

mcgehee proposed develop pilot project , first concentrate on 1 district. thorough survey of views of rural villagers , farmers made. province governor helped recruit select group of twenty-five agents start. beside police, included military officers, several administrators, , high-ranking educator. part of team 4 translators , pat armed force protection against communist guerrillas. questionnaires developed , survey s interrogators trained in use out of hearing range of other[s] . started village networks community support , ongoing intelligence sources. coordinate result, villagers confessed being duped communists, named other members, quit movement , joined government side.

lt. somboon gave motivating speech @ meeting of villagers called headman, countered communist propaganda. , others, however, used aggressive techniques involving simulated threats of death , other cruel ruses obtain information suspected guerrillas, or sow dissension in enemy ranks. such methods raised human rights issues mcgehee. counterinsurgency, if not careful, descend barbarous business. yet persuaded efficient intelligence process, if flawed, threw light on murky shadows guerrillas hid, save lives in long run of counterinsurgency war. in fact, survey , police presence resulted in many villagers abandoning armed communist insurgency.

survey information, collected translated, carded categories, , collated, , digested, written up. bits , pieces of vague, partial, shifting, incomplete, fragmentary intelligence , provided hitherto unknown total picture. revealed, among other things, communist insurgency in northeast thailand considerably stronger supposed. struck blow. survey distributed nationwide government , police officials, praised cia case officer responsible. cos rod johnson called him cia in bangkok work celebrated; promoted 2-year command in thailand. ralph mcgehee felt had hit stride, , reaching new levels of professional skill , acumen.

colby visits, ends survey

william colby, chief of cia s far east division, came province in 1967. mcgehee proudly told him of teams work on district survey , findings, showing him file cabinets carded , collated intelligence information. communists in thailand, explained, far more numerous assumed. enjoyed substantial support among rural people. communists agents concentrated on winning cooperation of peasants, citing example of specific village. yet survey had, throwing light on insurgent violence, caused villagers re-think issues , many desert communist cause. mcgehee naturally expected appreciation colby , interest in furthering survey work. colby kept silence.

william colby, cia.

mcgehee described enemy s farmers liberation association (fla). recruited rural villagers, secretly indoctrinated communist plans widespread armed struggle in thailand. local guerrilla cadres launching minor terrorist assaults. in retaliation thai government ordered unfocused, brutal attacks fell on innocent farmers, creating atmosphere of hate communists eager exploit politically. contrary, mcgehee s survey teams had used our intelligence penetrate communists crucial shield of secrecy , accordingly had broken grip on villagers. farmers had confessed, given information, , quit fla. here, mcgehee felt presenting colby counterinsurgency program worked. otherwise, communists insurgents multiply in thailand, had happened in vietnam.

in response, colby appeared puzzled. non-committal, evasive, saying only, seem losing. later mcgehee realized colby weighing broader ramifications. colby , entourage left airport in jeeps , land rovers. 2 months later cos offered mcgehee plum cia job in taiwan on career channel ensuring rapid promotions. mcgehee wanted continue work in thailand. au contraire cos told him. had leave thailand in 3 weeks, , survey project terminated. despite local protests involved thai officials , american consul, happened way.